

WORLD MARKET SURVEY


The Recovery Continues

Amid additional signs that the U.S. economy was stabilizing, US stocks continued to rally in the quarter ending September 30. The Dow Jones Industrial Average gained 15.8%, its best third quarter performance since 1939. The broader Standard & Poor's 500 Stock Index was up 15.6% for the trailing three months. The quarterly advance extended the rally that began on March 10th of this year, and the S&P 500 is up over 56% from that date. The index now registers a 13.5% gain for the first nine months of the year. However, the return on the index for the past twelve months, including last year's 4th quarter meltdown, remains negative at -7.4%. Measured from the market peak in October of 2007, the index is off 32%.

Smaller US stocks also enjoyed a robust positive quarter, with the Russell 2000 index gaining 19.3%. Small stocks have advanced 22% for the year-to-date but are still down 9.6% for the trailing twelve months.

(continued on page 8)

Index Returns: Third Quarter 2009, Year-to-Date, & Trailing 12 Months



THE VALUE PREMIUM: AN EMPIRICAL UPDATE

We have written several articles about the value premium – the long term, risk-adjusted performance advantage value stocks have provided relative to growth stocks. Nobel laureate economist William Sharpe was one of the researchers who initially identified this phenomenon, suggesting the terms “value” and “growth” to describe two broad categories of companies that generate different return patterns. Sharpe classifies growth companies as firms with excellent earnings, sales, and profits, and value companies as firms that are distressed, and thus have low stock prices relative to book value. Conventional wisdom held that growing, profitable companies should generate higher stock market returns than troubled companies. However, research by Sharpe and others concluded that the opposite was true – troubled companies tended to generate higher stock market returns than excellent companies.

In our 1998 Q1 INVESTMENT QUARTERLY, our article, “In Search of Investment Excellence”, reported on several studies, published between 1987 and 1996 (including a study co-authored by Sharpe), that found that value stocks tend to outperform growth stocks in both US and foreign equity markets, and in both large cap and small cap categories. In our 2004 Q4 INVESTMENT QUARTERLY, we focused on the value premium again, citing additional studies that confirmed the historical performance advantage of value stocks relative to growth stocks, and discussing academic criticisms of models that presumed a sustained and material advantage for value stocks. A paper on the Schultz Collins website – *Multifactor Asset Pricing Models and the Rationale for Investing in Value Stocks* – addresses value investing in much greater detail.

Many Academics Reject Value Premium

Despite the wealth of evidence indicating that value stocks historically tend to outperform growth stocks, neither the academic community nor investment practitioners have uniformly accepted the value premium. In the academic community, the challenge is primarily methodological. Without a general theory explaining why the value premium should exist, some academics simply refuse to accept that it *does* exist. Conversely, investment practitioners tend to reject the value premium for philosophical reasons. Since much investment research seeks out excellent companies, data indicating that excellent companies earn lower market returns than distressed companies would invalidate the premise for this research. Rather than revisit the approach to investment research, it is much easier to simply ignore the data in support of a value premium,

THE VALUE PREMIUM: AN EMPIRICAL UPDATE

particularly when many academics also challenge its existence.

In academic circles, criticisms of the value premium generally come in three flavors:

- The value premium doesn't really exist. The premium measured by Sharpe and others might simply have represented a statistical anomaly attributable to the time period studied, or might have captured a different market characteristic, such as company size.
- The value premium does exist, but value stocks do not really offer superior risk adjusted returns relative to growth stocks. Rather, value stocks offer higher returns because they are subject to risk factors that were not captured by traditional metrics (such as standard deviation) used in the studies. These critics noted that published studies reported on outcomes, but did not include a comprehensive and coherent theory explaining the value premium. Some critics offered possible explanations, such as recession risk – the tendency for value stocks to underperform growth stocks prior to a recession. If the study periods did not include a sufficient number of recessionary periods, recession risk would not have been reflected in performance results, although value stocks would still be subject to this risk.
- The value premium did once exist. But as soon as studies about the premium were published, value stocks began to attract more capital. This incremental demand would eventually cause the value premium to disappear, unless other factors, such as limited liquidity, constrained the flow of capital into value stocks.

Differing Indexes, Differing Opinions

As a practical matter, some investment practitioners are firm believers in the value premium, managing portfolios that tilt heavily towards value stocks. Others reject the very idea, and tilt portfolios toward the stocks of excellent companies that Sharpe describes as growth stocks. Most fall somewhere between these two extremes, building portfolios that include both value and growth stocks. Some of these intermediate practitioners believe that value and growth stocks will rotate through periods of strong relative performance. Value will outperform in some periods, growth in others, and in some periods, returns from growth and value will be similar. Practitioners who believe these growth/value cycles are unpredictable will typically

construct portfolios with relatively static allocations to growth and value. Conversely, those who believe the cycles are predictable will rotate portfolios between growth and value based on their forecasts, adopting a form of active management that is similar to market timing.

Why do practitioners have such a divergent range of opinions about growth and value? Part of the explanation stems from the basic nature of investing – portfolio management is a highly uncertain proposition, with portfolios managed primarily for safety generating predictable but low returns, and with portfolios managed for higher returns subject to the vagaries of capital markets. In this environment, portfolio managers often seek to enhance returns or reduce risk by subjectively determining what securities look particularly attractive. To generate returns better than those of the overall market, the manager must have an opinion about the security that differs from the market consensus. Simply put, practitioners are paid to have opinions on a broad range of investment topics, including explanations for growth and value.

The method practitioners use to examine the data could influence their opinions about growth and value. Most practitioners evaluate investment categories by reviewing the characteristics and performance of benchmark indexes. There are numerous indexes measuring the performance of growth and value stocks; different indexes cover different periods, and adopt different definitions of growth and value. Practitioners may form different opinions about growth and value due solely to the characteristics of the indexes they find most informative.

Academic studies generally use benchmark indexes covering relatively long time frames, and concentrated definitions of growth and value. The academic indexes typically decompose the market into growth, value, and core (neither growth nor value) companies. Furthermore, the academic studies seek to control for other factors, such as capitalization. Conversely, indexes used by practitioners tend to be less concentrated (most practitioner indexes don't exclude core companies), tend to cover shorter time periods, and don't control for other factors. Given the differences in indexes reviewed, it's not surprising that academics and practitioners reach different conclusions about growth and value.

Today's Value Premium in Various Capital Markets

Let's review the growth/value performance question by comparing the performance of various growth and value indexes, in US large cap, US small cap, foreign large cap, and foreign small cap categories. We will compare index pairs with different inception dates, and with more or less concentrated definitions of growth and value. To simplify the review, we will

Simply put, practitioners are paid to have opinions on a broad range of investment topics, including explanations for growth and value.

Given the differences in indexes reviewed, it's not surprising that academics and practitioners reach different conclusions about growth and value.

determine the value premium by subtracting growth index returns from the value index – we won't try to control for differences in capitalization, or other variables. We recognize that this simplified method is not how academics believe the value premium should be approached. However, since investors seeking to exploit the value premium generally do so by investing in funds that directly or indirectly track these indexes, evaluating the return differential between growth and value indexes represents a reasonable way to ascertain likelihood of success.

The table below summarizes the primary characteristics of various growth and value index pairs, including the average calendar value premium from the later of index inception or January 1964, through December 2008 (we start with data from January 1964 to avoid reaching conclusions based on old data patterns, and to be consistent with Sharpe's approach). A cursory review of the table indicates the following patterns in the data:

- Generally, index pairs with earlier inception dates demonstrate higher value premia. This may indicate that value premia are declining over time – an observation consistent with the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), which holds that any asset category that offers an opportunity for higher risk-adjusted returns than are expected from its alternatives will be exploited by investors, and over time, the incremental capital they direct to the category will eliminate the value premium.

- The Fama/French index pairs generate much higher value premia than other pairs, in both US large cap and small cap stocks. This could be due to their longer history, to their use of a more concentrated value definition, or to other factors.
- Small cap index pairs generate higher value premia than their large cap counterparts, in both US and international stocks.

Trends in the Value Premium

One of the problems with using average values is that they obscure trends. Conversely, evaluating a volatile statistic such as the value premium over a relatively brief period, such as a calendar year, is equally problematic, because the random "noise" inherent in the statistic's volatility masks the underlying trend.

To better evaluate trends in the data, we can calculate the value premium for an index pair across a rolling ten year period. Since the ten year calculation likely includes periods of relative strength for both growth and value, the ten year function smoothes away much of the random noise. And since many series have quite a bit more than ten years of history, we can review how the rolling ten year value premium has changed over time, which is a way to discern trends in the data.

The Large Cap Value Premium

The chart on the following page illustrates the rolling ten year value premium for US large cap stocks, as calculated using the Fama/French (grey bars), Russell


... evaluating a volatile statistic such as the value premium over a relatively brief period, such as a calendar year, is equally problematic, because the random "noise" inherent in the statistic's volatility masks the underlying trend.

Index Pair	Concentration	Years of Data	Avg. Value Premium
US Large Cap Indexes			
Fama/French Large Growth/Value	Concentrated	45	2.7%
Russell 1000 Growth/Value	Diluted	30	1.3%
MSCI 750 Growth/Value	Diluted	16	1.4%
S&P/Citigroup 500 Growth/Value (standard)	Diluted	14	-0.8%
S&P/Citigroup 500 Growth/Value (style pure)	Concentrated	14	-1.1%
US Small Cap Indexes			
Fama/French Small Growth/Value	Concentrated	45	5.8%
Russell 2000 Growth/Value	Diluted	30	4.0%
MSCI 1750 Growth/Value	Diluted	16	2.0%
S&P/Citigroup Small Cap Growth/Value (standard)	Diluted	14	2.2%
S&P/Citigroup Small Cap Growth/Value (style pure)	Concentrated	14	0.9%
International Large Cap Indexes			
MSCI EAFE Growth/Value	Diluted	16	1.4%
S&P EPAC Broad Market Growth/Value	Diluted	19	1.9%
International Small Cap Indexes			
MSCI EAFE Small Cap Growth/Value	Diluted	16	2.0%
S&P EPAC Small Cap Growth/Value	Diluted	19	2.5%

... the EMH holds that any asset category that offers an opportunity for higher than expected returns will be exploited by investors ...

THE VALUE PREMIUM: AN EMPIRICAL UPDATE

Ten Year Rolling Value Premium in Domestic Large Cap Stocks



The graph indicates that the value indexes performed consistently better than their growth counterparts for ten year periods ending in the 1970s and 1980s.

(maroon bars) and S&P style pure (yellow bars) index series. The year listed on the chart represents the end of the ten year period. For example, 1973 represents the average value premium for the ten year period beginning in January 1964 and ending in December 1973. The Fama/French series includes data for all rolling ten year periods; the Russell series begins in 1988 (since the Russell indexes begin in January 1979 and first have a ten year history at the end of 1988) and the S&P style pure series begins in 2005. These are relatively new indexes, holding only slightly more than ten years of data.

The graph indicates that the value indexes performed consistently better than their growth counterparts for ten year periods ending in the 1970s and 1980s. However, this observation is based primarily on data from the Fama/French series, with some corroborating data from the Russell series in the late 1980s. Conversely, the value premium was negative for most of the 1990s, reaching its nadir for the ten year period ending in 1999 (the last year of the 90's bull market in tech stocks). Since 2000, the data have been mixed, with the Russell series generally reflecting a small positive value premium, while the Fama/French and S&P style pure data indicate outperformance from growth stocks.

We can plot a regression line against the Fama/French large cap rolling ten year data. The slope of the regression line may be interpreted as an approximation of the trend in the value premium. This approach reinforces our observation that the large cap value premium has diminished over time, becoming negative for ten year periods ending in the bull market for growth stocks experienced during late 1990's.

Note that a linear regression is only one way to illustrate a trend. While the linear approach is simple, it incorporates some significant potential drawbacks. For example, the linear approach can't identify changes in trend direction – the line continues at whatever slope best fits the overall data. Looking at data for large cap value premium as measured by Russell – the red bars in the chart above – it appears that a curve, reaching its minimum around 1999, would be a better fit. Unfortunately, creating usable non-linear trends requires more data than we have available in this simplified review.

Perhaps it is coincidental, but the value premium has generally been missing from the US large cap stock market for ten year periods beginning after 1987 – the publication date of the earliest papers finding empirical evidence that a value premium exists. EMH proponents might argue that broad knowledge of the value premium caused it to disappear.


The Small Cap Value Premium

However, a similar graph tracking the rolling ten year value premium for US small cap stocks illustrates a very different pattern. In small cap stocks, the value premium is positive across virtually every ten year period, except the ten year period ending in 1999. And all three indexes generate relatively similar results across most rolling ten year periods.

Additionally, while the slope of the regression line for the Fama/French small cap rolling ten year data is slightly negative, indicating a diminishing trend for the value premium, the regression indicates a positive expected premium for small cap value stocks across the entire 45 year period.

In small cap stocks, the value premium is positive across virtually every ten year period, except the ten year period ending in 1999.

Ten Year Rolling Value Premium in Domestic Small Cap Stocks




The International Stock Value Premium

International stock indexes generally have later inception dates than US indexes. Since less data are available, we review the value premium in international stocks using rolling five year data instead of rolling ten year data. Although the five year periods will include more volatility related noise, using rolling five year periods allows us to compile a sufficient number of data points to evaluate trends in the value premium using our regression line technique. Since there are fewer growth/value index pairs available in international stocks, we can review both international large cap and small cap value premia in a single chart. We present comparative data from four pairs of international stock indexes; S&P EPAC large cap and small cap, and MSCI EAFE large cap and small cap.

While comparing data series covering different periods and calculated using different methodologies can introduce spurious observations, it's interesting to note that like the US index pairs, the two international index pairs, in both the large cap and small cap categories, illustrate a negative value premium during the tech stock driven bull market of the late 1990s. Unlike the US indexes, the regression lines for the S&P EPAC Large Cap and Small Cap value premia have an upwards slope, indicating a value premium that is increasing over time. However, this apparent difference may be due more to the brief period for which data on international stocks are available than to any real underlying difference in trend. It might also indicate that a curve fits the data better than a straight line, as we suggested might be the case for the Russell large cap indexes.

... it's interesting to note that like the US index pairs, the two international index pairs, in both the large cap and small cap categories, illustrate a negative value premium during the tech stock driven bull market of the late 1990s.

Five Year Rolling Value Premium in International Stocks



THE VALUE PREMIUM: AN EMPIRICAL UPDATE

The international data indicate a sharply negative value premium for five year periods ending in 1999 and 2000, followed by a significantly positive value premium for five year periods ending in 2004, 2005 and 2006. This anomalous pattern, tracking the dot com boom and bust cycle, may be masking the true trend of the international stock value premium.

Conclusions

While our brief review of the value premium in different capital markets is unscientific, in the sense that we have not tried to control for other variables, it helps explain why practitioners disagree about whether the value premium exists. Calculating the value premium across extended rolling periods, we find it unpredictable, and negative across at least some time periods.

Comparing index pairs with relatively concentrated and diluted definitions of growth and value, we find little advantage for the concentrated value index. Although the average value premium for the concentrated Fama/French indexes tends to be higher than for diluted index pairs, the apparent Fama/French advantage appears to come from value's relative outperformance in the 1960's and 1970's, prior to the inception date of the other indexes. In fact, the concentrated pure versions of the S&P/Citigroup index pairs show smaller value premia than their more diluted standard counterparts, in both large cap and small cap categories. While we have not examined annual results, it is not surprising that concentrated index pairs show a much greater disparity in annual results than dilute index pairs. The concentrated index pairs show a much higher value premium when positive; when negative, they likewise show a more significantly negative value premium.

As some proponents of EMH might have predicted, the empirically measured historical value premium has generally illustrated a downward trend since the academic literature first postulated its existence. EMH proponents argue that capital directed towards capturing the value premium would necessarily eliminate it. While the trend appears to be downward for both US large and small cap markets, direction is less clear in international markets, due to the relatively limited history of international indexes. Interestingly, the current empirical data indicate that while the value premium generally appears to have been eliminated in US large cap stocks, it continues to exist, albeit in slightly diminished form, in US small cap stocks. However, the less concentrated Russell indexes illustrate a recent resurgence in historical value premium for US large cap stocks that might presage a change in trend direction in this category.

While the data are less clear, it appears that international stocks also continue to offer a value premium. These observations are also consistent

with most forms of EMH, which argue that exploitable excess return factors, such as those for the value premium, will be eliminated more quickly in relatively liquid markets, such as those for US large cap stocks, than in relatively illiquid markets, such as those for US small cap or international stocks. Some new investment products seek to exploit these liquidity factors by pursuing the value premium in particularly illiquid, narrowly focused capital markets, such as emerging markets small cap value stocks.

Our simplified, linear trend analysis of historically measured return differentials between value and growth should not be construed as a prediction of the future for the value premium. To the extent that a trend exists, it is not likely to be strictly linear over extended periods. Rather, the trend is more likely to follow a curving pattern, with the premium increasing over some periods, and declining over other periods. Unfortunately, the available data set is insufficient to effectively plot a curving trend line on rolling ten year data.

For purposes of strategic portfolio design, "loading for value" – intentionally allocating a larger portion of the portfolio to value stocks in an attempt to capture the value premium – continues to represent a rational investment approach, provided the investor has a reasonably long holding period of at least five to ten years. Data from multiple index pairs across a range of investment categories seems to confirm the premise that value indexes generate higher average returns than growth indexes over time. However, the investor should understand that disproportionate value exposure might result in lower than expected portfolio returns, since return differentials vary significantly across different investment periods, with growth indexes materially outperforming value indexes over extended periods and in all asset classes in some market environments. Investors seeking solely to capture market returns should not load for value, while investors seeking better than market returns should approach the value tilt cautiously – too much value at the wrong point in time could cause significant underperformance.

Finally, successful style rotation – dynamic shifts between growth and value – requires an ability to forecast the value premium. But such a forecast could only be derived from an accurate forecast of markets in general, so that possession of the information needed to understand the future of the value premium would obviate the advantage to be found in that understanding. If you know what markets are going to do anyway, why bother yourself with the detail of the future career of the value premium? In practice, forecasting the value premium is just as difficult as forecasting future returns from the stock market overall.

Calculating the value premium across extended rolling periods, we find the premium to be unpredictable, and negative across at least some time periods.

For purposes of strategic portfolio design, "loading for value" – intentionally allocating a larger portion of the portfolio to value stocks in an attempt to capture the value premium – continues to represent a rational investment approach, provided the investor has a reasonably long holding period of at least five to ten years.

SURVEY OF INDICES & FUND AVERAGES
PERIOD AND ANNUALIZED COMPOUND RETURNS IN PERCENT

	Third Quarter 2009	12 months Ending 09/30/2009	3 Years Ending 09/30/2009	5 Years Ending 09/30/2009	10 Years Ending 09/30/2009
Inflation Index & Risk Free Rate					
Consumer Price Index	0.01	-1.32	2.09	2.50	2.55
U.S. 3-Month Treasury Bills	0.04	0.39	2.63	2.96	2.96
U.S. Stock Market (Large Companies)					
Standard & Poor's (S&P) 500 Index	15.61	-6.91	-5.43	1.02	-0.15
S&P/Citigroup Large Cap Growth Index	13.56	-2.62	-2.88	1.06	-2.26
S&P/Citigroup Large Cap Value Index	17.94	-11.43	-8.09	0.84	1.36
Average Large Cap Blend Fund ‡	15.59	-5.46	-5.13	1.22	0.69
U.S. Stock Market (Small Companies)					
Russell 2000 Index	19.28	-9.55	-4.57	2.41	4.88
Dimensional U.S. Micro Cap Fund	19.31	-8.84	-6.39	1.30	8.08
Russell 2000 Growth Index	15.95	-6.32	-2.60	2.91	1.10
Russell 2000 Value Index	22.71	-12.61	-6.65	1.78	8.05
Average Small Cap Blend Fund ‡	19.04	-6.97	-5.19	-2.02	6.79
Real Estate					
DJ Wilshire REIT Index	35.44	-29.35	-13.74	1.15	9.72
Fixed Income (Bond) Markets					
BarCap Government Bond Index	2.03	6.74	6.75	5.19	6.21
Avg. Intermediate Gov't Bond Fund ‡	2.82	8.13	5.52	4.30	5.25
BarCap Municipal Bond Index	7.12	14.85	5.13	4.78	5.77
Average California Intermed/Short Muni Bond ‡	5.88	9.59	3.51	3.36	4.30
Credit Suisse High Yield Bond Index	14.11	17.89	4.74	5.65	6.65
Average High Yield Bond ‡	13.11	13.16	2.57	4.11	4.47
Citigroup World Gov't Bond Index	6.16	13.78	9.41	6.65	6.70
Average World Bond Fund ‡	7.97	14.82	6.86	5.44	6.27
International Stocks					
MSCI EAFE Foreign Stock Index	19.47	3.23	-3.60	6.07	2.54
Average Foreign Large Blend Stock Fund ‡	18.75	1.06	-3.95	5.78	2.53
MSCI Europe Stock Index	22.92	1.57	-3.65	6.36	3.29
MSCI Pacific Stock Index	13.15	6.89	-3.57	5.43	0.94
MSCI Emerging Mkt Index (excl. dividends)	20.07	16.15	5.51	14.52	8.86
Average Emerging Markets Fund ‡	21.08	13.76	5.27	15.14	11.45

‡ Source: Morningstar Principia 9/30/2009

(continued from page 1)

Foreign Markets Continue Rally

Shares of large companies in the developed foreign markets paced those in the U.S. for the quarter. With the falling dollar boosting dollar-denominated foreign equity returns, the MSCI Europe Stock Index gained 22.9% for the three months ending September 30, and is up 31.5% for the year-to-date. The dollar-adjusted Europe Index is also positive for the past twelve months, at 1.6%. The quarterly performance of the MSCI Pacific Index was muted somewhat by Japan, where a newly elected government caused considerable uncertainty. However, a surge in the value of the Yen against the dollar had a positive effect for U.S. shareholders. Consequently, the Pacific Index enjoyed a 13.1% quarterly return, up 24% since January. The Pacific Index has also overcome the negative fallout from last year's fourth quarter, and is showing a 6.9% gain for the trailing twelve months, in U.S. dollar terms.

The emerging markets continued to provide investors with healthy returns this year, generating 20% for the quarter. The index is now up an impressive 61% for the year-to-date and 16.1% for the trailing twelve months.

More Progress in the Bond Market

After suffering an epic freeze in late 2008, the credit markets have since resumed a sense of normalcy. The combination of strong investor demand and low interest rates motivated corporations to issue new bonds, something they were unable to do during the height of the crisis. A total of \$166 billion in bonds were sold in the third quarter, more than double the rate for the same period last year.

Meanwhile, as the yield on U.S. Treasury Bills and money market funds remained stalled at close to zero percent, investors seemed willing to chase higher returns by delving into longer maturities and lower rated bonds. High yield bonds (also known as junk bonds) gained 15% last quarter as demand pushed prices up and yields down. Treasury bonds gained 2.1% last quarter, including yield and price changes. The 1-Year Treasury note finished the quarter with a yield of 3.3%, down slightly from 3.5% at the end of June. Reflecting the Fed's policy of keeping short-term rates near zero, one month U.S. Treasury Bills registered a total return of 3/100ths of one percent for the recent quarter, and are up exactly 19/100ths of a percent for the past twelve months. These anemic yields are probably driving some investors back into stocks.

Commodities Break Step

After a nearly perfect unison last year, commodities have diverged in recent months. Oil was flat for the quarter at \$70.61/barrel, just 1% more than at June 30. Copper jumped 24% for the quarter. New supplies pushed natural gas down 55% for the quarter. Inflation fears were cited for the run up in gold to more than \$1,000/ounce.

REIT's increased in line with the broader U.S. market last quarter. The Dow Jones Wilshire REIT Index was up 17.6%, and has surged 35.4% from January to the end of September. However, the index plummeted during the crisis last year and the results for the trailing twelve months remain depressed, at -29.3%.

Individual Country Returns Third Quarter 2009

	U.S. Dollar	Local Currency
North America		
United States	15.7	15.7
Canada	19.4	10.3
Latin America		
Brazil	29.0	17.2
Chile	5.5	9.3
Mexico	17.0	20.0
Africa		
South Africa	14.6	12.4
Europe		
Austria	34.7	29.3
Belgium	27.3	22.2
Denmark	20.3	15.4
Finland	16.9	12.2
France	27.0	21.8
Germany	24.1	19.1
Great Britain	17.7	21.2
Ireland	28.2	17.5
Italy	26.7	21.5
Netherlands	31.6	26.3
Norway	25.8	13.4
Portugal	22.4	17.4
Spain	26.0	20.9
Sweden	27.7	15.3
Switzerland	22.5	16.9
Asia		
Australia	31.9	20.8
Hong Kong	11.4	11.4
Indonesia	33.6	26.5
Japan	5.9	-1.8
New Zealand	22.4	9.6
Philippines	16.7	14.9
Singapore	19.1	15.9
South Korea	32.4	22.5
Taiwan	19.5	17.1
Thailand	22.8	20.5

Source: Dow Jones Global Indexes

SCHULTZ COLLINS LAWSON CHAMBERS

INVESTMENT COUNSEL

www.schultzcollins.com

455 Market Street, Suite 1450 | San Francisco, CA 94105
877.291.2205 Fax 415.291.3015

1912 Sunderland Place NW | Washington, D.C. 20036
202.429.0200 Fax 202.331.3803

22 West Pennsylvania Avenue, Suite 606 | Towson, MD 21204
410.583.5800 Fax 410.339.7833

QUALIFIED RETIREMENT PLANS
PRIVATE INVESTORS
TRUSTS, ENDOWMENTS & FOUNDATIONS